Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

Lewis Duncan, individually and as personal
representative of the Estate of Patrick Duncan,
deceased, et al. v. Union Pacific Railroad Company,
a corporation, The State of Utah, Paul Kleinman,
and Does 1-100, inclusive : Response to Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Allan L. Larson; Craig L. Barlow; Anne Swensen; Snow, Christensen and Martineau; Stephen J.
Sorensen; Assistant Attorney General; J. Clare Williams; Larry A Gatenbein; Attorneys for
Appellees.
Michael A. Katz; Burbidge and Mitchell; Attorneys for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, No. 900233.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3028

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

•Vi

taii-F

3.9
59

OCKET NO.

fS«S

J***H
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEWIS DUNCAN, individually
and as personal representative
of the Estate of PATRICK
DUNCAN, deceased, et al.#
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation; THE
STATE OF UTAH; PAUL KLEINMAN;
and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive,

Case No. 900233

Defendants/Appellees,
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY'S
AND PAUL KLEINMAN'S
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
Allan L. Larson, Esq.
Craig L. Barlow, Esq.
Anne Swensen, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Stephen J. Sorensen, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

J. Clare Williams, Esq.
Larry A. Gantenbein, Esq.
406 West First South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Appellees
Union Pacific Railroad Co,
and Paul Kleinman

Attorneys for Appellees
State of Utah
Michael A. Katz, Esq.
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Appellants

FILED
SEP 4 1992
CLERK SUPREME COURT,
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LEWIS DUNCAN, individually
and as personal representative
of the Estate of PATRICK
DUNCAN, deceased, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation; THE
STATE OF UTAH; PAUL KLEINMAN;
and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive,

Case No. 900233

Defendants/Appellees,
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY'S
AND PAUL KLEINMAN'S
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
Allan L. Larson, Esq.
Craig L. Barlow, Esq.
Anne Swensen, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Stephen J. Sorensen, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

J. Clare Williams, Esq.
Larry A. Gantenbein, Esq.
406 West First South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Appellees
Union Pacific Railroad Co,
and Paul Kleinman

Attorneys for Appellees
State of Utah
Michael A. Katz, Esq.
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Appellants

ARGUMENT
POINT I,
Plaintiffs Misstate the Facts
Plaintiffs, at page 4 of their Petition, seriously
misstate

the

facts

recommendation

concerning

regarding

the

UDOT's
Droubay

evaluation
Road

and

crossing.

Plaintiffs would have the Court believe that UDOT found the
crossing warning devices inadequate in November, 1981 and,
based

upon

such

findings,

recommended

installation

of

automatic signals and then failed to follow through on such
recommendation.
contrary,

UDOT's

This

simply

November,

is

not the

1981

case.

inspection

To

the

revealed

no

hazards then existing which justified upgrading the warning
devices.

The inspection report dated November 10, 1981,

specifically
(R.302).

states:

"No

sight

dist.

restrictions."

However, the inspection team did recommend, based

upon a predicted future significant increase in vehicular
traffic, that upgrading take place "at such time as federal
funding became available." (R.305, 312). Specifically, only
100 cars per day were using the crossing as of the November,
1981 inspection

(R.176); however, based upon information

received from Tooele County, the inspection team projected
that

1,500 vehicles per day were "expected" to use the

crossing

in the

future.

(R.176, 305, 312, 359).

This

prediction, however, did not come true as determined by

Union Pacific Railroad Company's and Paul Kleinman's
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ongoing monitoring of the crossing by UDOT.
the

issue

again

in

June,

1982

and

UDOT reviewed

consciously

against making the crossing a "high priority."
358).

decided

(R.352, 351,

According to UDOT and Federal Highway Administration

("FHWA") officials, the crossing was not ranked high enough
on the state's "hazardous index," which was the priority
ranking

system

being

used

then,

to warrant

making

improvements at that time (R.356-357, 317-315).

any

UDOT made

another inspection on June 3, 1983, some seven weeks after
the accident.

This inspection determined that daily useage

was up to only 580 vehicles per day, far short of the 1500
vehicles per day erroneously projected in 1981.
In short, UDOT did not

fail to implement

install automatic signals at the crossing.

(R.301).

a decision to
UDOT monitored

the crossing and simply determined that the actual vehicle
count did not justify installation of automcttic signals.
Accordingly, there is no evidenciary basis for arguing that
UDOT was negligent in failing to implement
recommendation.

UDOT

simply

changed

it's

it's earlier
recommendation

because of a change in the facts regarding the vehicle
count.
Plaintiffs also distort the facts by implying, at page
7, that the accident happened "through no fault of their
own;" that "hazardous conditions" existed at the crossing;
and that UDOT and/or Union Pacific were negligent in causing

Union Pacific Railroad Company's and Paul Kleinman's
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the accident.

These are totally unsupported allegations

without any foundation in the record.

To the contrary,

Judge Hanson observed at p. 2 of his "Memorandum Decision/1
that

"there was no evidence to support the plaintiffs'

claims that the Railroad operated the train in a negligent
manner (R. 487); and at pp. 10-11, that:
"While any railroad crossing can be hazardous, it
is hard to imagine a crossing that presents a
smaller hazard than the one in question before the
Court." (R.479-478).
Furthermore, there is no evidence or finding that plaintiffs
decedents were free of fault in causing the accident.

The

issues of the negligence of the driver, Patrick Duncan, and
the role played by the drugs and alcohol were not argued to
or addressed by the trial court or on appeal.

Accordingly,

it is inappropriate for plaintiffs to conclude that their
decedents were without fault in causing the accident and to
then argue based upon such a bare assertion, that "laudatory
tort theories and public policy concerns" which legitimately
support

recovery

by

fault-free

injured

persons

against

negligent tort feasers also support their cause here.
POINT II.
Plaintiffs Misstate the Law
It is incorrect for plaintiffs to argue, at p. 8, that
this Court's decision in this case "relieved railroads from
traditional duties to answer for damages arising out of

Union Pacific Railroad Company's and Paul Kleinman's
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hazardous railroad crossings."

That statement is erroneous

for at least two reasons:
First,

nothing

in

the

Court's

decision

relieves

railroads from their "traditional11 duties of using due care
in appropriately operating train warning devices (whistle,
bell and lights), in operating the train at a reasonable
speed, in the train crew maintaining a reasonable lookout,
in maintaining the physical structure of the crossing so
that

automobiles

can

have

a

reasonably

smooth

and

unobstructed drive over the tracks, and in not creating
obstructions to view at the crossing with respect to matters
over which railroads have control (e.g., vegetation on the
right of way).
Second, it

is the

railroads

of

a

duty

hazardous

crossings,

legislature which
to

not

evaluate
the

and

Court.

"relieved" the
signalize

The

Court

extra
simply

confirmed the public policy decisions made earlier by the
legislature which established an orderly statutory scheme
for

assigning

crossings.
exclusive

responsibilities

for

safety

at

railroad

Furthermore, the legislature's decision to place
responsibility

for

evaluating

railroad

crossings with UDOT is now

federal

enactments

[Federal

Rail

and

fully

Safety

signalizing
supported by

Act

of

1970

("FRSA"), 45 U.S.C. S 421 et seg. and Highway Safety Act, 23
U.S.C. § 401 et seg.], and federal court decisions.

In the

Union Pacific Railroad Company's and Paul Kleinman's
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closely analogous case of Hatfield v. Burlington Northern R.
Co., 958 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1992) (copy attached as Exhibit
"A"), decided after submission of the briefs in this case,
the Tenth Circuit specifically ruled that:
1. Section 434 of the FRSA expressly preempts
state law regarding the adequacy of railroad
crossing warning devices;
2.
The preemption occurred upon the Federal
Highway Administration adopting the Manual on
Uniform Traffic Control Devices ("MUTCD"), which
set nationally uniform standards for evaluating
and signalizing railroad crossings;
3. The federal government has delegated to state
agencies the exclusive responsibility to evaluate
and install warning devices at railroad crossings,
in accordance with MUTCD standards ; and,
4. Railroads have been absolved from complying
with duties imposed by state (statutory or common)
law
regarding
safety
devices
at
railroad
crossings.
Thus,

Utah's

statutory

scheme

which

assigned

exclusive

responsibility to evaluate and signalize railroad crossings
to UDOT is in harmony with federal requirements, and this
Court's decision in Duncan is therefore correct.
Plaintiffs also misstate the law, at p. 8, regarding
the Railroad's obligation to pay the costs of installing

Utah has statutorily adopted the MUTCD as the state
standard for traffic control devices at U.C.A. S 41-6-20.

Union Pacific Railroad Company's and Paul Kleinman's
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automatic warning devices.

Preemptive federal regulations

[23 C.F.R. § 646.210(a) and (b)(1)] state that::
"(a) State laws requiring railroads to share in
the cost of work for the elimination of hazards at
railroad-highway crossings shall not apply to
Federal-Aid projects.
(b) Pursuant to 23 U.S.C. S 130(b), and 49 CFR S
1.48:
(1) Projects for grade crossing improvements are
deemed to be of no ascertainable net benefit to
the railroads and there shall be no required
railroad share of the costs."
(emphasis added).

Thus, consistent with federal guidelines,

governmental authorities (federal and local agencies) paid
the complete
device

cost of the subsequently

improvements

installed

warning

at the Droubay crossing, with Union

Pacific assuming the continuing maintenance expenses.
ongoing

expenses

traditionally

far

exceed

These

installation

costs.
Plaintiffs erroneously state, at p. 9, that "there is
absolutely no reason the state's duty [to evaluate the need
for and install automatic devices] precludes the railroad
from having a concurrent duty."
schemes

Federal and state statutory

(FRSA and S 54-4-14 et seq.) delegate exclusive

responsibility for this function to UDOT (and the Public
Service Commission on appeal) and leave no room whatsoever
for any part of this responsibility to be delegated to or
assumed by the Railroad.

Indeed, any such duty which might

be imposed statutorily or by the courts would run contrary
Union Pacific Railroad Company's and Paul Kleinman's
Answer to Petition for Rehearina
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to and be preempted by the FRSA as interpreted in Hatfield,
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the specific language
of paragraph 8D-1 of the MUTCD:
,f

. . .effectively prohibits a railroad from acting
on its own to select and install a safety
device,. . .moreover, it absolves the railroad of
any independent duty regarding grade crossing
safety devices.fl
958 F.2d at 323.
Plaintiffs also misinterpret § 56-1-11.

That section

does not and should not be interpreted to impose a duty upon
railroads to signalize crossings.

As discussed at pp. 22-23

of defendants' brief on appeal, prior decisions of this
Court

indicate

language

of

that the
§

"good and

56-1-11

sufficient crossings"

delegates

to

railroads

the

responsibility to maintain a crossing surface which allows
motorists to make a reasonably smooth and obstruction free
drive over a railroad crossing, not a duty to construct
warning

devices.

plaintiffs'

There

are

no decisions

interpretation.

inappropriate

to

interpret

In
this

which

support

fact,

it

would

be

statute

as

argued

by

plaintiffs since to do so would place it in direct conflict
with

§

54-4-14,

et seq.,

and

the

federal

statutory

preemption imposed by the FRSA.
Plaintiffs

misstate

the

effect

of

Utah

Court

of

Appeals' holding in Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R. Co.,
749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) and this Court's ruling in

Union Pacific Railroad Company's and Paul Kleinman's
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Duncan.

The

holdings

in

inconsistent in any way.
consistent

with

each

statutory

enactments

explained.

Gleave

these

two

cases

are

not

Indeed, the decisions are totally

other
and

and

and with

federal

Duncan

state

case

law,

in

total

are

and

federal

as

earlier

harmony

in

stating that railroads have no duty with respect to the
function

of

evaluating

or

installing

devices at railroad crossings.

automatic

warning

The cases are also in total

agreement in stating that in spite of being relieved of this
responsibility, railroads continue to have duties to operate
their

trains with

reasonable

care and to remove visual

obstructions at crossings over which they have control, such
as obstructions on their rights of way.
that

such rulings

and

standards

of

Defendants submit

care are simple

to

understand and apply by trial courts and counsel.
Finally,

defendants

do

not

rely

on

the

federal

preemption argument except to the extent that it is fully
supportive

of

Gleave1s

and

Duncanf s

interpretation

of

S 54-14-14, et seq. as preempting the Railroad's common law
duty

regarding

crossings.

evaluating

and

signalizing

railroad

Indeed, there is nothing here for federal law to

preempt since the state is in full conformity with federal
statutory

requirements,

as

explained

in

Hatfield.

Preemption would only occur if state law were interpreted to

Union Pacific Railroad Company's and Paul Kleinman's
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impose such a duty on railroads which would be contrary to
the requirements of the FRSA.
CONCLUSION
When viewed in the light of the correctly stated facts
and law, plaintiffs' arguments raise nothing new for the
Court's consideration.

The arguments are based upon faulty

premises and should be rejected on this basis alone.

The

arguments also run counter to the stated rationale which
underlies the decisions in both Duncan and Hatfield, of not
wanting to circumvent the careful and orderly macro-view
approach to addressing railroad crossing safety matters that
has been structured by legislators and public agencies on
both the state and national levels. As stated in Hatfield:
"Continuing resort to common law standards after a
state adopts MUTCD disrupts a basic purpose of
FRSA as it is implemented by the provision of
funding, namely, recognition of priorities. FRSA
contemplates that some sites are more dangerous
than others and that resources should first be put
to use on the more dangerous ones, all in
accordance with a rational scheme based on
surveys. This is a prospective-looking system.
Jury verdicts based on common law standards, which
are of a high degree of abstraction and
generality, are retrospective-looking and are
addressed to only one crossing rather than a
system of crossings. The hit-or-miss common law
method runs counter to a statutory scheme of
planned prioritization."
958 F.2d at 324.
Union Pacific

submits that the Court's decision in

Duncan is correct, that plaintiffs have provided no basis

TTni'nn

Dar«ifir<

Pa i 1m a H

nr\mr\2kr\ir • e

an/i

Dan 1 V l o ^ n m a n ' s

-

1H —

for

the

Court

to

reconsider

it's

decision,

and

that

plaintiff's petition should be denied.
DATED this

* f ^ day of September, 1992.

J.nSTare Williams
406 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorney for Union Pacific
Railroad Company and Robert
Kleinman
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Robert E. HATFIELD,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD
COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant,
No. 91-3158.
United States Court of Appeals.
Tenth Circuit.
March 6, 1992.
Truck driver brought action against
railroad to recover for injuries caused by
truck-train collision. Railroad moved for
summary judgment on issue whether railroad was required to install active warning
devices at cross. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas. 757
F.Supp. 1198, Patrick F. Kelly, Circuit
Judge, held that date of Kansas Department of Transportation's approval of
project to install signals at crossing was
earliest possible date that federal law
preempted railroad's common-law duty, denied the motion and railroad appealed. The
Court of Appeals. John P. Moore, Circuit
Judge, held that once the Secretary of
Transportation adopted the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices on Streets
and Highways, state regulation of railroad
grade crossings was preempted, even if
there had been no determination as to what
the specific device would be required for a
given grade crossing.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Federal Courts «»766
Court of Appeals will apply de novo
standard of review when considering a de
cision on summary judgment and will use
the same standard applied in the district
court.
2. Federal Courts «=>766
If no genuine issue of material fact
exists. Court of Appeals will determine if
substantive law was correctly applied by
• TjjC Honorable Wayne E. Alley, United States
District Court Judge for the Western District of

district court when it issued decision on
summary judgment.
3. Railroads ®»243, 307(3)
States <s=>18.21
Once the Secretary of Transportation
adopted the Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices on Streets and Highways,
state regulation of railroad grade crossings
was preempted, even if there had been no
determination as to what the specific device
would be required for a given grade crossing; Manual contained federal standard for
grade crossings. Federal Railroad Safety
Act of 1970, §§ 101 et seq., 204(a, b), 205.
45 U.S.C.A. §§ 421 et seq., 433(a, b), 434.

Phillip R, Fields, Wichita. Kan., for defendant-appellant.
Timothy J. King (Terry S. Stephens, with
him. on the briefs) of Stinson, Lassweil &
Wilson. Wichita, Kan.f for plaintiff-appellee.
Before McKAY and MOORE, Circuit
Judges, and ALLEY, District Judge.*
JOHN P. MOORE, Circuit Judge.
I.
This is an interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) from a decision denying
Burlington Northern Railroad Companys
motion for partial summary judgment on
the issue of whether Robert E. Hatfield's
common law negligence claim arising from
a grade crossing collision is preempted by
the Federal Railroad Safety Act The district court held preemption had not occurred. Hatfield v. Burlington Northern
R.R. Co., 757 F.Supp. 1198 (D.Kan.1991).
We reach the opposite conclusion and reverse.
Plaintiff Hatfield filed a multi-claim complaint alleging the defendant Burlington
Northern Railroad was negligent because,
among other reasons, it did not install an
active warning device at a grade crossing
Oklahoma, sitting by designation.

HATFIELD v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN R. CO.
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Cite M 938 F2d 320 (10th Clr. 1992)

where a truck he was driving coiiided with
one of Burlington's trains. At the time of
the collision, the crossing was marked oniy
by a standard crossbuck sign. Buriington
moved for partial summary judgment on
this claim, contending it had been preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act
(FRSA), 45 U.S.C. § 421 et seq., and railroad safety rules, standards, and regulations adopted by the Secretary of Transportation

-^
The district court denied the motion. Analyzing the issue of preemption.1 the court
concluded Congress explicitly expressed an
intent in FRSA § 434 to preempt the subject of adequate crossing warnings once
the Secretary of Transportation has acted
upon this subject,2 but found no such action
had occurred. Despite Burlington's argument that the Secretary took that action by
adopting the Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices on Streets and Highways
(MUTCD), the court held that preemption
does not occur until a formal determination
is made under the MUTCD of the exact
type of warning device to be installed at
the crossing. Following the district court's
certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), this
appeal was taken.
[1,2] We apply a de novo standard of
review when considering a decision on summary judgment, Barnson v. United States,
816 F.2d 549, 552 (10th Cir.). cert denied,
484 U.S. 896, 108 S.Ct 229, 98 LEd.2d 188
(1987), and we use the same standard applied in the district court. Osgood v. State
Farm Mut Auto Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141,
1. State law is preempted under the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution in three
circumstances. English v. General Elec Co., 496
VS. 72. 7S-79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275. 110 LEcL2d
65 (1990). First Congress can define explicitly
the extent to which its enactments preempt state
law. Id. Second, a pervasive scheme of federal
regulation may indicate congressional intent to
occupy an entire field. Third, state law is
preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with
federal law. Id.

143 (10th Cir.1988). If no genuine issue of
material fact exists, we determine if the
substantive law was correctly applied. Applied Genetics Int% Inc. v. First AjfHiated Sec, Inc.. 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th
Cir.1990). Because there are no disputed
facts, the issue before us is ripe for summary determination.
II.
[3] In 1970, with the adoption of FRSA.
Congress required the Secretary of Transportation to study and develop solutions to
problems associated with railroad grade
crossings. 45 U.S.C. § 433(a) (1976).
FRSA also directs the Secretary to address
the grade crossing safety problem under
his authority over highway traffic and
safety. 45 U.S.C. § 433(b) (1976). Under
the Highway Safety Act, 23 U.S.C. §§ 401404 (1982), the Secretary lias the responsibility to develop uniform standards and to
approve state-designed highway safety programs as a condition precedent to the receipt by the state of federal highway
funds. Through the Federal Highway Administration, the Secretary prescribed procedures to obtain uniformity in highway
traffic control devices and adopted the
MUTCD. 23 C.F.R. § 655.601 (1981).*
With this background, we begin our
analysis by agreeing with the district court
that § 434 of FRSA states an express preemption of state law. We also agree preemption does not occur until the Secretary
adopts a rule, regulation, or standard covering the subject matter of the state law.
or standard relating to railroad safety until
suck time as the Secretary (of Transportation/
has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or stan*
dard covering the subject matter of such State
requirement A State may adopt or continue
in force an additional or more stringent law.
rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to
railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or
reduce an essentially local safety hazard, and
when not incompatible with any Federal law.
rule, regulation, order, or standard, and when
not creating an undue burden on interstate
commerce.
45 U.S.C. § 434 (emphasis added).

2. Section 434 states in part:
The Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations, orders, and standards relating to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the 3. Kansas has specifically adopted the MUTCD
standards at KaiuStaiAnn. § 8-2003 and
extent practicable. A State mav adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, order. Kan.Admm.Regs. B2-7-4(c) (1989).
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Thus, we must determine whether any of
the standards adopted by the Secretary
cover the subject matter of the duty to
install active warning devices at railroad
crossings where unusuaily dangerous conditions exist 4
"'•
While this court has not addressed the
question, it has arisen in other courts with
mixed results. In Marshall v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 720 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th
Cir.1983), the court said:
The [MUTCD] prescribes that the selection of devices at grade crossing and the
approval for federal funds is to be made
by iocal agencies with jurisdiction over
the crossing. Thus, the Secretary has
delegated federal authority to regulate
grade crossings to local agencies.
The locality in charge of the crossing
in question has made no determination
under the manual regarding the type of
warning device to be installed at the
crossing. Until a federal decision is
reached through the local agency on the
adequacy of the warning devices at the
crossing, the railroad's duty under applicable state law to maintain a "good and
safe" crossing
is not preempted.
Following Marshall in Nixon v. Burlington Northern R.R., No. CV 85-384-BLGJFB, 1988 WL 215409 (D.Mont May 2,
1988), the court found preemption because,
prior to the incident in litigation, the State
of Montana made an agreement with the
raiiroad to install flashing light signals
with automatic gates at the crossing where
the incident occurred. In Smith v. Norfolk
& Western Ry. Co., 776 F.Supp. 1335
(N.D.Ind.1991), the court applied Marshall

and granted partial summary judgment because prior to plaintiffs accident, the local
agency determined the necessary safety devices at the crossing and certified that the
project was complete. In Anderson v. Chicago Cent & Pac. R.R. Co., 771 F.Supp.
227 (N.D.I11.1991), the court found the railroad failed to present evidence that the
Illinois Commerce Commission made any
determination under the MUTCD on the
type of warning device to be installed at
the crossing where the collision occurred.
I n Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933
p 2 d 1548 (11th Cir.1991), the court held
preemption did not occur where a state,
because of financial constraints, failed to
implement a decision to install a particular
p j , ^ ^ Southern Pac.
s i g n a l device#
Transp. Co. v. Maga Trucking Co., 758
F.Supp. 608 (D.Nev.1991), although citing
Marshall the court found no preemption
where the Nevada Public Service Commis3 j o n had issued a report recommending the
crossing be upgraded with flashing lights
and automatic gates, but, at the time of the
accident the improvements had not been
m a d e because the railroad claimed it had
n o t r e i v e d federal funds.

The dilemma presented by these varied
results must be solved by resort to the
language in the regulations adopted by the
Secretary. First, all traffic control devices
proposed for railroad crossings must comply with the uniform federal standards expressed in the MUTCD. 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(bXD.5 Second, all states must adopt
the MUTCD and its revisions in order to
receive federal highway funding. 23

4. Courts have found the Secretary has acted
v. Public Utils. Commn of CaL 820 F.2d 1111
upon other safety subjects. See, e.g., Burlington (9th Cir.1987) (track clearance and walkways);
Northern RJL Co. v. State of Mont.. 880 F.2d
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Railroad Comm h of Tex.,
1104 (9th Or. 1989) (cabooses); Burlington
850 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1988) (cabooses), cert,
Northern R.R. Co. v. State of Minn., 882 F.2d
denied, 488 VS. 1009, 109 S.CL 794, 102 UEdld
1349 (8th Cir.1989) (cabooses): Sisk v. National
785 (1989)
HR. Passenger Corp., 647 F.Supp. 861 (D.Kan.
1986) (speed limit); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Public
Utils. Commn of Ohio, 901 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 5. Fills provision relates to "grade crossing improvements and states: "All traffic control de1990) (hazardous materials), cert, denied, —
vices proposed shall comply with the latest ediUS.
, HI S.CL 781, 112 LEoUd 845 (1991);
tion of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Public Utils.
Devices for Streets and Highways supplemented
Commn of Ohio. 926 F.2d 567 (6th Cir.1991)
to the extent applicable by State standards."
(walkways); but see Southern Pac, Transp Co

HATFIELD v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN R. CO.
Cite as 958 F2d 320 (10th Or. 1992)

C.F.R. § 655.603(b)(1). Third, the MUTCD
standards are "intended for use both in
new installations and at locations where
general replacement of present apparatus
is made." MUTCD, 18A-2.
Fourth, the MUTCD specifically states:
With due regard for safety and for the
integrity of operations by highway and
railroad users, the highway agency and
the railroad company are entitled to jointly occupy the right-of-way in the conduct
of their assigned duties. This requires
joint responsibility in the traffic control
function between the public agency and
the railroad. The determination of need
and selection of devices at a grade crossing is made by the public agency with
jurisdictional authority. Subject to such
determination and selection, the design,
installation and operation shall be in accordance with the national standards contained herein.
MUTCD, Part VIII. " 8A-1. This provision
is particularly important for two reasons.
One. it circumscribes the authority to determine what "devices'' shall be erected at
a grade crossing to "the public agency with
jurisdictional authority." Two, it also
makes the "installation and operation'' of
such devices subject to the determination
of that agency. Thus, until a determination of need is made, no new device can be
installed or operated at a crossing.
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would prohibit a railroad from voluntarily
deciding to put in place an improved warning device . . . during the gap period." Id.
at 1206. Thus, the court reasoned, the
railroad has the authority (and assumably
the duty) to install an improved warning
device at a dangerous crossing during the
"gap period." We disagree.
The district court's conclusion overlooks
the specific language of MUTCD 18D-1
which states:
The selection of traffic control devices
at a grade crossing is determined by
public agencies having jurisdictional responsibility at specific locations
Due to the large number of significant
variables which must be considered there
is no single standard system of active
traffic control devices universally applicable for grade crossings. Based on an
engineering and traffic investigation, a
determination is made whether any active traffic control system is required at
a crossing and, if so, what type is appropriate. Before a new or modified grade
crossing traffic control system is installed, approval is required from the
appropriate agency within a given
State.
(emphasis added). This regulation effectively prohibits a railroad from acting on
its own to select and instill a safety device,
contrary to the district court's conclusion.
Moreover, it absolves the railroad of any
independent duty regarding grade crossing
safety devices.6

The operation of !J!18A-1 and 2 results in
a consequence which concerned the district
VI.
court. Assuming preemption occurred
when the MUTCD was adopted or when the
The scheme of regulation is patent. ConSecretary promulgated 23 C.F.R. § 646.- gress expressed an intent to invade the
200. the court reasoned that a significant field of grade crossing safety devices, postdelay could be encountered before a safety poning that invasion only until the Secredevice would be installed. The court be- tary of Transportation adopted a rule, reglieved this "gap period" is inconsistent with ulation, order, requirement, or standard re"the recognized view that '§ 434 manifests lating to that field. The Secretary has
an intent to avoid gaps in safety regula- responded by adopting the MUTCD and
tions.' " Hatfield 757 F.Supp. at 1205. making it applicable to grade crossings.
Moreover, the court found "no regulation Recognizing the variability of conditions
promulgated by the Secretary . . . which that can arise at each intersection, the Sec6. See also Kan^taLAnn. § 8-1512 which states:
(a) No person snail place, maintain or display
upon or in view of any highway any unautho-

rued sign, signal, marking or device which
purports to be or is an imitation of or resembles an official . . . railroad sign or signai.
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retary has delegated to local authority the
responsibility of assessing the needs and
establishing the design for safety devices.
Nonetheless, the statutory mandate for the
adoption of a standard that would supplement any state requirement for grade
crossing safety devices is satisfied by the
adoption of the MLTCD. To that extent
then, we disagree with Marshall
Our disagreement with Marshall goes
beyond our differing analysis of language
in FRSA and MUTCD pertaining to preemption of common law standards of care
for grade crossings, however. Continuing
resort to common law standards after a
state adopts MUTCD disrupts a basic purpose of FRSA as it is implemented by the
provision of funding, namely, recognition
of priorities. FRSA contemplates that
some sites are more dangerous than others
and that resources should first be put to
use on the more dangerous ones, all in
accordance with a rational scheme based on
surveys. This is a prospective-looking system. Jury verdicts based on common law
standards, which are of a high degree of
abstraction and generality, are retrospective-looking and are addressed to only one
crossing rather than a system of crossings.
The hit-or-miss common law method runs
counter to a statutory scheme of planned
prioritization.
Having adopted the MLTCD, the Secretary prescribed the standard required by 45
U.S.C. § 434. and any state law relating to
grade crossing safety devices was then superseded. All § 434 requires for preemption to occur is the adoption of the standard, and the MUTCD contains the standard. Postponing the determination of
what specific device is required for a given
grade crossing is simply a matter of implementing that standard. The scheme enacted by Congress did not anticipate that the
effect of the standard was to be deferred
or made selectively applicable for each
grade crossing in the United States. To
the contrary, once the Secretary adopted
the standard, its superseding effect became
uniform throughout the nation
We do not believe leaving responsibility
for implementation of the standard to local

authority diminishes this result Requiring
a local survey of grade crossings to determine need and design is no more than a
pragmatic response to the multitude of conditions that exist throughout the country
which dictate whether and what kind of a
device is required at a specific place.
Nonetheless, with the adoption of the
MUTCD, the Secretary has absolved railroads from complying with duties imposed
by state law regarding safety devices at
grade crossings. Without such a duty, a
railroad cannot be liable in common law
negligence for failure to provide adequate
safety devices at a grade crossing.
The judgment of the district court is
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to grant defendants motion for
summary partial judgment and for further
proceedings on plaintiffs remaining claims.
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